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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is proper under Section 78-2a-
3(2)(j). The appellants' statement of jurisdiction is mistaken. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit arose out of the January 1990 sale of the 
Capitol Motel by Hasin Oh and Myung Oh (the "Ohs") to Wayne 
Takashi Satsuda and Seon Sil Satsuda (the "Satsudas"). The Ohs 
and Satsudas entered into an Earnest Money Sales Agreement for 
the sale on November 16, 1989 and executed the final closing 
documents in the transaction on or about January 5, 1990. 
On March 15, 1990, the Satsudas initiated this civil action 
against the Ohs. In a Complaint setting out three causes of 
action, the Satsudas claimed that the Ohs had failed to tell them 
of zoning and regulatory code violations that plagued the Capitol 
Motel. The Satsudas maintained that as a result of these legal 
deficiencies, they were denied the benefit of their bargain in 
purchasing the Capitol Motel; were forced to initiate costly 
administrative proceedings to obtain a zoning variance; and were 
obliged to make extensive repairs to the Motel. 
In their first cause of action, the Satsudas claimed that 
the Ohs breached warranties in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
in three respects: 
1. the Capitol Motel had sufficient parking spaces under 
Salt Lake City zoning regulations to allow for the rental of only 
33 of its 40 rooms at any time to the public; 
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2. Several of the Capitol Motel's rooms had inadequate 
ventilation as well as substandard plumbing and electrical 
fixtures; and 
3. Seven of the Motel1 s rooms were constructed without a 
Salt Lake City building permit. 
In their second and third claims, the Satsudas alleged that 
the Ohs intentionally misrepresented the physical condition of 
the Capitol Motel and the Motel's compliance with applicable 
zoning and regulatory requirements. The second cause of action 
took as its misrepresentations the three deficiencies set out in 
the First Cause of Action, while the Third Cause of Action 
maintained that although the Ohs represented that the Capitol 
Motel was a 40-unit motel, it was actually only a 33-room 
facility due to various health, safety, and building code 
violations that afflicted seven of its rooms. 
On April 8, 1993, the Ohs filed a third-party action against 
the Ums from whom they had purchased the Capitol Motel in May 
1987. In their Third-Party Complaint, the Ohs alleged that the 
Ums knew of the Capitol Motel's structural and legal faults yet 
failed to disclose them prior to the 1987 sale. The Ohs sought 
monetary damages from the Ums and indemnification for any damages 
for which they might be found liable to the Satsudas. 
On February 14-15, 1995, trial was conducted to the Court, 
the Honorable Dennis Frederick presiding. At trial the Satsudas 
pressed only three claims against the Ohs. They argued that they 
were due monetary compensation for: (1) profits lost due to their 
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inability to rent the seven motel rooms that were constructed by 
the Ums without a building permit; (2) costs incurred to bring 
the seven rooms into compliance with Salt Lake City health and 
safety regulations; and (3) attorney's fees incurred to obtain a 
zoning variance authorizing the operation of a 40-room motel with 
only 33 parking stalls. 
The District Court took the matter under advisement at the 
close of the evidence and on February 17, 1995 rendered its 
decision from the bench. In its ruling the Court declared that 
the Satsudas had failed to state any cause of action against the 
Ohs and, accordingly, dismissed their Complaint with prejudice. 
In light of the Satsudas' failure of proof, the Court also 
determined that the Ums could not be held liable to the Ohs on a 
theory of indemnity and therefore dismissed the Third Party 
Complaint with prejudice. 
On May 2, 1995, Judge Frederick's "Order of Dismissal of 
Complaint and Third-Party Complaint and Judgment in Favor of 
Defendant Ohs against Plaintiff Satsudas for Attorney's Fees" 
(the "May 2 Order and Judgment") was entered on the judgment 
docket of the District Court. In the May 2 Order and Judgment, 
the Court memorialized the elements of its February 17 oral 
ruling. Specifically, the Court concluded: 
1. The Complaint of Plaintiffs against Defendants 
Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh be and herewith is .dismissed, 
with prejudice, on the merits, the Court finding no 
cause of action thereon. 
2. The Third-Party Complaint against Third-Party 
Defendants Kee Hong Urn and Shi Ja Urn be and herewith is 
dismissed with prejudice, on the merits, the Court 
3 
finding no cause of action thereon as a result of the 
Court finding no cause of action on the Complaint. 
3. Defendants Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh are awarded 
their attorney's fees as requested against Plaintiffs 
Wayne Takashi Satsuda and Seon Sil Satsuda, [in the 
amount of $44,959.86 plus post-judgment interest], the 
Court finding chat the fees requested are reasonable 
and necessary and that an adequate bases in the 
contract exist for such an award. 
4. The Court denies the Third-Party Defendants' 
Application for Attorneys Fees at this time, without 
prejudice subject to further proceedings concerning 
that application. 
May 2 Order and Judgment at 2-3; ROA, V. 4 at 1655-58. On June 5, 
1995 the Satsudas filed a Notice of Appeal from the District 
Court's May 2 Order and Judgment. 
On June 9, 1995, Judge Frederick's "First Amended Order of 
Dismissal of Complaint and Third Party Complaint and Judgment in 
Favor of Defendant Ohs Against Plaintiff Satsudas for Attorney's 
Fees (the "First Amended Order") was entered. The First Amended 
Order differed from the May 2 Order and Judgment in only one 
significant respect. Where the May 2 Order and Judgment stated 
that "[t]he Court denies the Third-Party Defendants Application 
for Attorney's Fees at this time, without prejudice subject to 
further proceedings concerning that application," the First 
Amended Order read "[t]he Court awards the Third-Party 
Defendants' reasonable attorney's fees at this time subject to 
further proceedings concerning the amount to be awarded which 
shall be the subject of a further order and judgment." On July 
10, 1995, the Satsudas filed an "Amended Notice of Appeal" from 
the First Amended Order. 
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As directed by the First Amended Order, the Ums submitted 
supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law pertaining 
to their claim for attorney' s fees and drafted a proposed 
Supplemental Judgment that awarded them fees of $56,126.77 plus 
post-judgment interest. On July 7, 1995 the District Court 
executed the Supplemental Judgment and its associated findings 
and conclusions. On July 27, 1995, the Satsudas filed a "Second 
Amended Notice of Appeal" from the July 7 Supplemental Judgment 
and on August 2, 199 5, the Ums submitted their Notice of Appeal 
from the Supplemental Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Capitol Motel was in dilapidated condition when it 
was bought by Kee Hong Urn and Shi Ja Urn (the "Ums") on September 
1, 1982. Immediately thereafter Salt Lake City officials closed 
the Capitol Motel entirely. ROA, V. 3 at 1185. 
2. One room on the second floor of the Capitol Motel's 
main building had been converted from a storage area to a rental 
unit by Lon Garcia, the owner of the Capitol Motel prior to the 
Ums. Id. at 1186. 
3. In the Spring of 1983 the Ums completed repairs to the 
Capitol Motel that restored all 34 of the Motel* s licensed rental 
units to operation. Id. at 1185. 
4. Also in the Spring of 1983, the Ums covered over the 
swimming pool on the Capitol Motel grounds to allow construction 
of a small grocery store on the Capitol Motel premises. Id. at 
1186. 
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5- In January 1984, the Urns converted the grocery store 
into rental units, giving the Capitol Motel a total of 40 units 
available for rent when the Ohs purchased the property in 1987. 
Id. 
6. The Uins knew that no building permit had been obtained 
for the conversion of the grocery store into the five rental 
units. The Urns did not instruct their construction contractor to 
obtain such a permit and none was obtained. Id. 
7. The Urns never notified Salt Lake City officials that the 
five additional units were constructed on the Capitol Motel 
premises. Id. 
8. The Urns did not amend their business license for the 
Capitol Motel after adding the five new units. Instead, the Urns 
annually renewed their business license to show only a 34-unit 
motel. Id. at 1187. 
9. During the Urns' ownership of the Capitol Motel, the Salt 
Lake City-County Health Department and the Salt Lake City Fire 
Department inspected the Motel's buildings and grounds. Both 
agencies found that the Motel met applicable inspection standards 
after repairs were completed in 1982-83. Id. at 1186. 
10. On March 21, 1985, the Capitol Motel was inspected by 
Salt Lake City officials under Construction Permit No. 33603 and 
approved for occupancy. Id. at 1186. 
11. After passing inspection on March 21, 1985, the Urns 
never received any written notice that the additional five units 
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did not meet Salt Lake City building code standards. Id. at 
1187. 
12. Thereafter, the Urns operated the Capitol Motel with a 
total of 40 rooms available for rent to the public. Id. 
13. From March 21, 1985 until January 1990, the Capitol 
Motel passed every health, building, and fire inspection 
following the construction of the five additional rooms. Id. 
14. On February 28, 1987, the Urns executed an Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement with the Ohs for the sale of "a 40-unit motel 
called Capitol Motel" for $550,000.00. Id. 
15. Between the execution of the February 1987 Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement and the closing of the sale of the Capitol 
Motel, the Urns told the Ohs that they could earn a good income 
from the operation of the and gave the Satsudas copies of the 
Motel's handwritten income and expense statement. The Urns also 
told the Ohs that they had remodeled or repaired most of the 
rooms in the Capitol Motel and had made repairs to the main 
building of the Motel. Id. at 1187-88 
16. In conjunction with the 1987 sale of the Capitol Motel, 
the Urns also told the Ohs that the Motel had up to 40 units 
available for rental. Id. at 1188. 
17. The Ohs visited the Capitol Motel about ten times prior 
to executing the February 1987 Earnest Money Sales Agreement. 
During those visits the Ohs inspected only a few rooms on the 
ground floor of the Motel's main building. Id. at 1188. 
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18. The Ohs did not obtain a professional inspection of the 
Capitol Motel before purchasing it from the Urns. Id. 
19. At no time before or after the 1987 sale of the Capitol 
Motel did the Ohs expressly ask the Urns to provide information 
about parking, building inspections, construction of additional 
rooms, putting additional rooms into service, or inspection of 
the Motel property by the Urns or Salt Lake City officials. Id. 
20. On March 20, 1987, the Salt Lake City/County Health 
Department inspected the Capitol Motel and found only minor 
infractions of health regulations such as dust under a bed, a 
dirty bathroom, and no lid on the Motel dumpsters. Id. 
21. On May 1, 1987, the Urns as sellers and the Ohs as 
buyers executed a Uniform Real Estate Contract for the purchase 
of the Capitol Motel. The purchase price of the Motel was 
$540,000.00. Id^ _ at 1189. 
22. During their ownership of the Capitol Motel, the Ohs 
advertised to the public that the Motel had 40 rental units. In 
addition, the Ohs consistently rented more than 34 units at a 
time to the public. Id. 
23- The Salt Lake City Fire Department conducted fire 
safety surveys on the Capitol Motel in 1982, 1984, 1986, in 
November 1989, January 1990, February 1990, and June 1993. Id. 
at 1189. 
24. The Salt Lake City Fire Department's :<Premises History 
Report" for the Capitol Motel shows that minor fire code 
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violations were noted in the Fire Department1 s 1986 inspection. 
These discrepancies were promptly corrected- Id. 
25. The Premises History Report also shows that the Capitol 
Motel passed fire safety surveys on November 7, 1989 and January 
4, 1990, just before the Ohs sold the property to the Satsudas. 
Id. 
26. On November 16, 1989, the Ohs executed an Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement with the Satsudas for the sale of the Capitol 
Motel for $620,000.00. Id^. at 1189-90. 
27. During the negotiations for the sale of the Capitol 
Motel to the Satsudas, the Ohs represented orally and on Mr. Oh's 
business card that the Capitol Motel was a 40-unit motel. Id. at 
1190. 
28. Also during negotiations for the sale of the Capitol 
Motel to the Satsudas, Mr. Oh gave the Satsudas his business 
records which showed the Capitol Motelf s daily income figures for 
1987 through September 1989. The Ohsf business records showed 
the number of the Capitol Motel's units that were rented at any 
one time. Id. 
29. The Satsudas submitted an offer to purchase the Capitol 
Motel to a Mr. Kim, the Ohsf sales agent, after two meetings with 
the Ohs at the Capitol Motel. Id. 
30. The Satsudas inspected the Capitol Motel's laundry 
room, boiler rooms, and four or five rental units prior to 
closing their purchase of the Capitol Motel. Id.- at 1190. 
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31. Prior to closing on their purchase of the Capitol 
Motel, the Satsudas neither requested nor obtained an inspection 
of the Motel1 s buildings and grounds by a professional inspector 
or any other third party. Id. 
32. The Satsudas began operating the Capitol Motel on 
January 1, 1990. Id. 
33. The Ohs displayed the Capitol Motel's business license 
on the wall of the Motel office. The Satsudas examined the 
business license there on January 1, 1990, four days before they 
closed on their purchase of the Motel. Id. at 1191. 
34. On January 5, 1990, the Ohs assigned their purchaser's 
interest in the May 1, 1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract to the 
Satsudas. Id. 
35. On or about January 31, 1990, Lawrence Suggars, an 
enforcement officer with the Salt Lake City Department of 
Building and Housing Services, inspected the Capitol Motel 
premises. Mr. Suggars was accompanied on his inspection 
byrepresentatives of the Salt Lake City Fire Department and Salt 
Lake City Health Department. Id. 
36. During the course of his inspection of the Capitol 
Motel, Mr. Suggars called in additional Salt Lake City building 
inspectors to examine the Capitol Motel's electrical and plumbing 
systems. Id. at 1191. 
37. On February 12, 1990, the Salt Lake City Department of 
Building and Housing Services issued a "Notice of Deficiencies" 
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to the Satsudas stating that the Capitol Motel was in violation 
of certain city health and safety ordinances. Id. 
38. By letter dated February 22, 1990, Robert M. Bridge, 
the Salt Lake City Business License Supervisor, advised the 
Satsudas that the Capitol Motel's business license would not be 
approved due to the incorrect number of rental units listed on 
the license. Immediately thereafter the Satsudas corrected the 
number of units shown on their license. Id. at 1191-92. 
39. The Satsudas contacted the Urns about the Notice of 
Deficiencies. At that time, Mr. Urn told Mrs. Satsuda that he had 
fully disclosed to the Ohs the fact that the five additional 
rental units at the Capitol Motel had been built without a 
building permit. Id. at 1192. 
40. When the Ohs sold the Capitol Motel to the Satsudas, 
parking at the Motel was limited to only 33 vehicles, less than 
one vehicle per rentable room at the Motel. Id. 
41. The Satsudas spent approximately $2,500 in attorneys 
fees to obtain a variance in the parking requirements in order to 
allow the rental of all 40 of the Capitol Motel' s rooms. Id. 
42. During his January 1990 inspection of the Capitol 
Motel, Lawrence Suggars determined rooms 0, 7 and 35-39 were 
plumbed incorrectly and had substandard electrical wiring. Id. 
43. These remaining five rooms at the Capitol Motel were 
remodeled after the parking variance was approved by Salt Lake 
City in November 1990. Construction on rooms 0, 7 and 35-39 
started in February 1991 and was completed in March 1991. Id. 
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44. On January 5, 1994, the Satsudas sold the Capitol Motel 
for $860,000, a sum $240,000 greater than the price they paid 
for the Motel in January 1990- Id. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
For purposes of responding to the Opening Brief, and for 
those purposes only, the Ohs will adopt the Statement of Issues 
supplied by the Satsudas. In truth, there is no legitimate 
basis, either in law or in fact, for this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The format of the argument that follows generally tracks the 
presentation of argument in the Satsudas' Opening Brief. With 
respect to the Satsudas' claim that there was no basis in 
contract for the District Court* s award of attorney' s fees 
against them, the Ohs show the Court multiple sources in contract 
for that award as well as evidence in the record before the 
District Court that costs and fees were warranted under the terms 
of those agreements. 
In reply to the Satsudas' assertion that the Distict Court 
erred in its award of fees in favor of the third party defendants 
and against them, the Argument shows that under established Utah 
decisional law, taxing of a third-party defendant' s fees directly 
against the plaintiff in the case in chief is warranted where it 
was foreseeable that the plaintiff s claims, though ultimately 
unsuccessful, would trigger the third party action. 
The Argument next takes on the Satsudas' twin claims of 
fraud against the Ohs, both of which relate to the land sale 
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transaction from which this litigation stems. The Argument 
demonstrates thai; under the doctrines of caveat emptor and 
merger, as recently defined and illuminated in the decisions of 
this Court, both claims are barred as a matter of law. 
Finally, the Argument addresses the Satudas* belated special 
damages claim. This claim sounds in a theory of "loss of the 
bargain" and concerns costs of repair to the Capitol Motel that 
the Satsudas incurred, if at all, in 1991. Citing case law 
arising in Utah and other jurisdictions that have treated the 
issue, the Argument shows that this claim was extinguished by the 
Satsudas' realization of an embarrassingly great profit on the 
sale of the Capitol Motel in 1994. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE SATSUDAS ARE LIABLE FOR THE ATTORNEY' S FEES 
THAT THE OHS AND THE UMS INCURRED IN THIS LITIGATION. 
Beginning on page 14 of their Opening Brief, the Satsudas 
inflict on this Court and the other parties to this appeal 
sixteen pages of virtually impenetrable prose and legal argument 
in opposition to the District Court' s award of attorney* s fees to 
the Ohs and the Urns. The thesis of this segment of the Opening 
Brief escapes detection but at the risk of injecting unwanted 
precision to the Satsudas' contentions on attorneys fees, the Ohs 
will represent to the Court that the relevant issues with respect 
to this matter are these: 
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1. Is there any basis in contract for the District Court's 
award of attorneys fees in favor of the Ohs and against the 
Satsudas? 
2. Is there any basis in contract for the District Court's 
award of attorneys fees in favor of the Urns and against the 
Satsudas? 
3. May the "third party fee" rule be employed to tax the 
Urns' attorney' s fees directly against the Satsudas? 
As the Ohs show in the remainder of this Brief, the District 
Court rested its decision to assess the Ohs' and Urns' attorney' s 
fees directly against the Satsudas on a sound legal foundation. 
It therefore is incumbent on this Court to conclude that the 
District Court acted within the bounds of its discretion in 
awarding those fees and to affirm that Court' s ruling. However, 
should the Court determine that the Ohs' Brief presents 
persuasive arguments in favor of the award of their fees and 
costs against the Satsudas, it may sustain the District Court' s 
decision based on those arguments even if the District Court did 
not consider them. State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
THERE ARE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT BASES 
IN CONTRACT TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN FAVOR OF THE OHS. 
On or immediately after January 5, 1990, the Ohs and the 
Satsudas executed several interrelated documents to consummate 
the sale of the Capitol Motel to the Satsudas. The terms of at 
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least two of these documents provide a sufficient contractual 
basis to support the District Court's award of attorney's fees in 
favor of the Ohs. 
A. The January 5, 1990 Deed of Trust. On January 5, 1990, 
the Satsudas, as trustors, and the Ohs, as beneficiaries, 
executed a uDeed of Trust with Assignment Of Rents" in 
conjunction with the sale of the Capitol Motel. The Deed of 
Trust designated the Capitol Motel as security for the Satsudas' 
obligation to pay the Ohs approximately $102,000.00 for their 
interest in the Motel. See Stipulated Trial Exhibit No. 8, 
Addendum to this Brief, No. 1. The Deed of Trust contains the 
following provisions with respect to attorney' s fees: 
4. [The Satsudas agree] to appear in and 
defend any action or proceeding purporting to 
affect the security hereof, the title to said 
property, or the rights or powers of [the 
Ohs] or Trustees; and should [the Ohsl or 
Trustee elect to appear in or defend any such 
actions or proceeding, to pay all costs and 
expenses, including cost of evidence of title 
and attorney? fees in a reasonable
 SVm 
incurred by [the Ohs] or Trustee 
* * * * 
7. Should [the Satsudas] fail to . . . do 
any act as herein provided, then [the Ohs] or 
Trustee but without obligation to do so and 
without notice to or demand upon [the 
Satsudas] and without releasing [the 
Satsudas] from any obligation hereof, may . . 
. commence; appear in and defend any action 
or proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights or powers of 
[the Ohs] or Trustee; . . . and in exercising 
any such powers, incur any liability, expend 
whatever amounts in its absolute discretion 
it may deem necessary therefor, including 
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cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, 
and pay his reasonable fees. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
Paragraph 4 of the Deed of Trust imposes on the Satsudas the 
obligation to bear uall costs and expenses" that the Ohs may 
incur in defending their security interest in the Capitol Motel. 
Paragraph 7, which must be read in harmony with Paragraph 4, 
defines, by way of example, the type of activities in which the 
Ohs may engage to defend those rights and, of necessity, the 
source of the costs and expenses that may be levied against the 
Satsudas should the Ohs deem themselves unsecured under the Deed 
of Trust. 
In their Complaint, the Satsudas alleged that the Ohs 
breached certain warranties in the November 16, 1989 Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement as well as other implied warranties 
concerning accommodations at the Capitol Motel. Also by way of 
their Complaint, the Satsudas attempted to undermine the 
legitimacy of the January 1990 sale of the Capitol Motel by 
claiming that the Ohs intentionally misrepresented the condition 
of seven of the Motel1 s rooms prior to the sale. Finally, the 
Satsudas' Complaint argued that the Ohs misrepresented the 
revenues available from the operation of the Capitol Motel. 
Whether each of the Satsudas' causes of action is considered 
in isolation or in conjunction with its companions, the objective 
of the Satsudas* Complaint remains constant. By initiating 
litigation in the District Court, the Satsudas attempted to 
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overturn and abandon the contractual agreements by which the 
Capitol Motel was conveyed to them two months earlier. Implicit 
in the Satsudas' assault on their contractual arrangements with 
the Ohs was an attack on the rights the Ohs obtained as sellers 
of the Capitol Motel and beneficiaries under the Deed of Trust. 
The Complaint called into question two aspects of the 
Capitol Motel that were central to the negotiation and sale of 
that property in January 1990. They first challenged the Capitol 
Motel as a going commercial concern, alleging that the Motel' s 
historical revenue data were misleading and that its projected 
earnings were overstated. The Complaint also attacked the 
Capitol Motel' s legitimacy under Salt Lake City regulatory codes, 
maintaining that the Motel was renovated and expanded in 
violation of health, safety, and building codes and that the 
Motel' s business license was obtained by fraud. 
When the Satsudas launched their legal campaign against the 
Capitol Motel with their March 1990 Complaint, they directly 
challenged the security interest that the Ohs held in the Motel. 
Furthermore, by naming the Ohs as defendants, they gave the Ohs 
no choice but to enter the litigation to defend not only their 
own conduct but also the value of the Motel as security for the 
Satsudas' purchase obligation. 
It is hard to imagine conduct by a trustor better calculated 
than was the Satsudas' to invoke the protections afforded the Ohs 
by Paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Deed of Trust. The Satsudas 
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voluntarily entered into the purchase of the Capitol Motel; they 
voluntarily executed the Deed of Trust; and they voluntarily 
dragged the Ohs into the District Court litigation. They now 
cannot be heard to protest having to discharge their obligation 
to fund the cost of their breach of faith with the Ohs. 
And though Paragraphs 4 and 7 hold the Satsudas responsible 
for a broad range of the Ohs' legal costs and fees, these 
complementary provisions can hardly be found oppressive under the 
circumstances of this case. It was not the actions of an 
unforeseen stranger to the Deed of Trust that triggered 
litigation and with it the Satsudas' obligation to bear the Ohs' 
attorney1 s fees. Rather, it was the conduct of the Satsudas 
themselves. They, after all, filed the March 15, 1993 Complaint 
against the Ohs, thereby forcing the Ohs to enter and defend 
litigation challenging their legal rights in the Capitol Motel. 
B. The January 5, 1990 Assignment Of Contract. Even if 
the Deed of Trust provided insufficient legal grounds for the 
District Court' s assessment of the Ohs' attorney' s fees against 
the Satsudas, a contemporaneous and related document supplies an 
adequate basis in contract to sustain the award. The fundamental 
document of the Urns' 1987 sale of the Capitol Motel to the Ohs is 
a Uniform Real Estate Contract that the Ohs and Urns executed on 
May 1, 1987. See Stipulated Trial Exhibit No. 1, Addendum to 
this Brief, No. 2. To implement the Ohs1 subsequent sale of the 
Capitol Motel to the Satsudas in 1990, the Ohs transferred their 
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buyers' interest in the May 1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract to 
the Satsudas by executing an "Assignment of Interest" on January 
5, 1990. See Stipulated Trial Exhibit No. 8; Addendum to this 
Brief, No. 3. 
Under Paragraph 3.b. of the Assignment of Interest, and in 
consideration of the Ohs' transferring their interest in the 1987 
Contract to them, the Satsudas agreed to "save and hold harmless 
[the Ohs] of and from any and all actions, suits, costs, damages, 
claims and demands whatsoever" that were caused by the Satsudas' 
own conduct." Id.
 r 1f 3.b. (Emphasis added). 
The deliberately inclusive language of Paragraph 3.b. 
establishes the Satsudas* obligation to pay the Ohs1 attorney's 
fees beyond good faith dispute. This key provision of the 
Assignment of Contract is not merely an indemnity provision. 
That is, it does not defer the Satsudas' obligation to safeguard 
the Ohs' financial well-being until the Ohs are found legally 
responsible for payment of a sum certain in costs or fees or 
damages. Instead, Paragraph 3.b. requires the Satsudas to come 
forward at the moment the Ohs are exposed to even a threat of 
monetary loss and insulate the Ohs from all financial harm.2 
Moreover, Paragraph 3.b does not confine the Satsudas' 
contractual duty to hold the Ohs harmless to instances in which 
2 Nothing in the text of Paragraph 3.b. limits its 
application to the defense of the Ohs in legal matters. It also is 
intended to protect the Ohs' interests in equitable proceedings, 
administrative forums, and other quasi-judicial settings. 
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the Satsudas breach a contractual obligation either to the Ohs or 
to the Urns. Nor is it limited in application to matters in which 
third parties, responding to "acts" of the Satsudas, initiate 
proceedings against the Ohs. Paragraph 3.b. is drafted quite 
broadly and obliges the Satsudas to hold the Ohs harmless from 
the consequences of any "act" by the Satsudas that ensnares the 
Ohs' by virtue of their former status as a party to the 1987 
Contract. 
Here too, the Satsudas' own conduct is the key to their 
obligation to pay the attorney1 s fees that the Ohs incurred in 
this case. The Satsudas commenced the District Court litigation, 
charging the Ohs with intentional misrepresentation in the 
transactions by which they acquired the Ohs* buyers' interest in 
the 1987 Contract. Having taken this deliberate step against the 
Ohs, the Satsudas became responsible for the financial 
consequences that their lawsuit imposed on them. The District 
Court recognized this straightforward cause and effect 
relationship--and the Satsudas' agreement to be bound by 
Paragraph 3.b.--when it directed the Satsudas to pay the Ohs' 
costs and legal fees. Because there is an adequate basis in the 
record to support this action by the District Court, this Court 
must reject the Satsudas' petition to be excused from their 
consensual undertaking uto hold harmless" and affirm the District 
Court' s award of attorney' s fees in favor of the Ohs. 
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THERE ARE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT BASES 
IN CONTRACT TO SUPPORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN FAVOR OF THE UMS. 
Under paragraph 15 of the May 1987 Contract, the Urns and the 
Ohs agreed that: 
Should either party default in any of the 
covenants or agreements contained herein, the 
non-defaulting party or, should litigation be 
commenced, the prevailing party in litigation 
shall be entitled to all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which 
may arise or accrue from enforcing or 
terminating this contract, or in obtaining 
possession of the Property, or in pursuing 
any remedy provided hereunder or by 
applicable law. 
See Addendum to this Brief, No. 2 at 2. 
Though Paragraph 15fs mutual indemnification pact was 
originally binding on the Urns and the Ohs, the record shows 
clearly the Satsudas willingly assumed the Ohs' obligations and 
exposure to financial liability explicit in its terms. A proper 
interpretation of Paragraph 15 must be informed by the text of 
the Assignment of Contract. Under Paragraph 3.a. of the 
Assignment, the Satsudas agreed that in consideration of the Ohs 
transfer of the 1987 Contract to them, they would "duly keep, 
observe and perform all of the terms, conditions and provisions 
of the [1987 Contract] that are to be kept by the [Ohs]." 
Addendum to this Brief, No. 3. 
The legal implications of Paragraph 3.b. for the Satsudas 
could not be more certain. As this court has recognized, an 
assignment of a contract does not uoperate to cast upon the 
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assignees the duties and obligations or the liabilities imposed 
by the contract on the assignor." Hansen v. Green River Group, 
748 P.2d 1102, 1104 n.3 (Utah App.1988). However, a well-
established exception to the general rule in Hansen arises where 
the assignee of a contract assumes the contractual liabilities of 
his assignor. Id. Through the vehicle of Paragraph 3.a., that is 
precisely what the Satsudas did; they expressly and voluntarily 
agreed to "keep, observe and perform all of the termsr conditions 
and provisions of the ["1987 Contract] that are to be kept by the 
TOhslr " among them the obligation of the Ohs to be held 
accountable for attorney* s fees the Urns may incur to vindicate 
their rights under the 1987 Contract. 
As of January 5, 1990, the Satsudas held all of the Ohs? 
right, title, and interest in and all liabilities under the 1987 
Contract. The Urns therefore were entitled, in the wake of the 
Assignment of Contract, to exercise their rights under paragraph 
15 of the May 1987 Uniform Real Estate Contract to seek 
reimbursement of all costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee, either to enforce the terms of the Uniform Real' 
Estate Contract against the Satsudas or to pursue any remedy made 
available to them by applicable law. As a result, there was an 
adequate contractual basis in place at the time the Ohs joined 
the Urns to this lawsuit as third-party defendants to impose 
responsibility for the Urns1 attorney's fees directly on the 
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Satsudas. It is therefore disingenuous for the Satsudas to argue 
to the contrary in this appeal. 
THE OHS ARE ENTITLED TO HAVE UMS' ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AWARDED DIRECTLY AGAINST THE SATSUDA AS 
A COST OF DEFENDING THIS LITIGATION. 
In post-trial proceedings before the District Court, see 
ROA, V.4 at 1472-85, the Ohs argued that under the holding in 
Collier v. Heinz. 827 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1982), they may recover 
as consequential damages against the Satsudas any attorney's fees 
the District Court awarded against them and in favor of the Urns. 
As the Ohs pointed out to the District Court, such a recovery 
from the Satsudas is permissible because the Ohs* litigation with 
the Urns was a foreseeable consequence of the Satsudas' litigation 
with the Ohs. ROA, V.4 at 1484-85. In their Opening Brief, the 
Satsudas argue that this is not an appropriate case for 
application of the "third party fee" rule because this case does 
not precisely track the facts of Collier v. Heinz. 
The Satsudas confuse the vitality of the general "third 
party fee" rule with the acknowledged need to examine the facts 
of each case where the general rule is invoked to determine its 
applicability. Satsudas maintain that Ohs' misapplication of the 
general rule may be gleaned by reviewing two Utah decisions, 
South Sanpitch Co. v. Pack. 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah App. 1988) and 
Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 523 (Utah 1993). 
Neither of these cases supports Satsudas' argument that Ohs 
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cannot invoke the "third party contract" rule to recover their 
fees in litigating with the Urns. 
In South Sanpitch, a title company negligently failed to 
timely record the Plaintiff's deed. As a result the Plaintiff 
was forced to file a quiet title action against a third party. 
The Plaintiff sued the title company for the attorney's fees 
incurred in maintaining the quiet title action. The Court of 
Appeals allowed the recovery of those fees as part of the damages 
stemming from the title company's negligence, id. at 1282-83, 
stating the "third party fee" rules as follows: 
[E]ven where a contract does not provide for 
attorney's fees in the event of litigation 
between the parties, fees can be recovered as 
damages for breach of contract in certain 
situations. See, e,gt, Pacific Coast Title 
Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. 
£Q^, 7 Utah 2d 377, 325 P.2d 906 (1958). 
Likewise, it is settled that when the natural 
consequence of one's negligence is another's 
involvement in a dispute with a third party, 
attorney fees reasonably incurred in 
resolving the dispute are recoverable from 
the negligent party as an element of damages. 
South Sanpitch, 765 P.2d at 1282.3 
The Satsudas argue that the third party fee rule applies 
here because they had no control over Ohs' decision to file a 
third party complaint against the Urns; they had no privity of 
contract with the Urns; the main case involves a suit between the 
3 The opinion in Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, in citing 
South Sanpitch, merely holds that the South Sanpitch doctrine does 
not apply in a conversion case brought against a transfer agent by 
the shareholder of a corporation. Broadwater. 854 P.2d at 534-35. 
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Satsudas and the Ohs, not the Satsudas and the Urns; and the Urns 
were found not to be indispensable parties early in the case. 
These arguments are unavailing because issues of privity of 
contract, decisions to file the third party litigation, and 
determinations of indispensable party status are not 
determinative of the application of the third party fee rule. 
Neither South Sanpitch nor Broadwater declares or implies 
that such factors govern the application of the third-party tort 
rule. Rather, the test is one of "foreseeability" of third party 
litigation being triggered by the actions of the party against 
whom the claim for fees is pressed. Consequently, the question 
the Court needs to resolve here is whether it was foreseeable 
that the Satsudas' lawsuit against the Ohs would cause the Ohs to 
enter into litigation against the Urns. The answer is a 
resounding "yes." This because Satsudas1 allegations, as 
Satsudas well knew, drew into issue events that occurred and 
conditions that arose at the Capitol Motel while the Urns owned 
those premises. The only question as to the Ohs was whether the 
Ohs knew of these occurrences and conditions when they sold the 
Capitol Motel to the Satsudas. Clearly this factual predicate 
demonstrates the kind of "foreseeability" of a third party action 
contemplated in South Sanpitch, Broadwater and Collier v. Heinz. 
Consequently, the District Court was on firm ground, both 
factually and legally, when it awarded the Urns1 attorney's fees 
as well as Ohsf attorney's fees against the Satsudas. 
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THE ATTORNEY'S FEES REQUESTED BY OHS ARE 
REASONABLE AND SHOULD BE AWARDED BY THE COURT. 
In their Opening Brief, the Satsudas attack the 
reasonableness of the amount of attorney's fees, $44,959.86, that 
the District Court awarded the Ohs at the close of trial. Among 
the Satsudas' objections is a complaint that the attorney's fees 
request for the Ohs' prior counsel, Grant W.P. Morrison, contains 
no independent statement that the hours spent were necessary or 
reasonable or that the hourly rate reflected in Mr. Morrison's 
billings is customary in the community for similar services. See 
Opening Brief at 6. 
This criticism reveals the Satsudas' failure to marshall the 
evidence put before the District Court on the reasonableness of 
costs and fees claimed by the Ohs. On March 14, 1995, counsel 
for the Ohs submitted their Verified Application for attorney's 
fees to the District Court. That Application identifies every 
attorney and other legal professional who provided legal services 
to the Ohs; describes the legal services provided by each 
professional; specifies the billing rate of each professional; 
shows the total number of hours billed by each professional; 
summarizes the total dollar amount billed to the Ohs by each 
professional or retained law firm; states that all legal services 
provided to the Ohs were reasonably necessary and performed at a 
billing rate customary in the local community; and incorporates 
comprehensive, itemized billing statements spanning the entire 
course of the litigation before the District Court. See ROA, V.4 
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at 1472-1540. For the Satsudas to now claim on appeal that the 
attorney fee billings are somehow lacking in detail is to confess 
that they have either ignored or misunderstood the plain record 
before the District Court. The Satsudas' challenge to the 
specificity of the Ohsf billings is simply contrived and may be 
dismissed by this Court out of hand. 
The Satsudas next maintain that counsel for the Ohs have 
failed to distinguish the billable hours spent prosecuting the 
third party complaint from the billable hours spent defending 
against the principal action. With this criticism the Satsudas 
ask this Court to impose on the Ohs an impossible standard of 
proof. The issues in the Complaint and the Third Party Complaint 
were inextricably intertwined because all of the conditions in 
the property of which Satsudas complained were caused during Urnsf 
ownership of the Capitol Motel. Thus, most of the discovery 
taken and pleadings filed with respect to the issues of creation 
and knowledge of conditions at the Capitol Motel implicated the 
Urns as both percipient witnesses and parties on all such issues. 
For example, all parties not only attended but also participated 
in the deposition of Kee Urn. Mr. Urn's testimony was clearly 
relevant to the prosecution of claims and defenses in the main 
case as well as the advancement of the Ohs' third party claim. 
Because of the nature of the claims in this case, the contractual 
relationships among all parties, and the serial ownership of the 
real property at issue by all parties, the rule the Satsudas ask 
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this Court to impose on the Ohs calls for the etching of an 
infinitely fine line through the middle of all pre-trial and 
trial proceedings in the six-year history of this litigation. On 
one side of the line would be all costs and fees attributable to 
the case in chief; on the other side--and presumably distinct 
from all else--would be the costs and fees arising in the third 
party action. The Ohs submit that such an exercise is best left 
to Jesuits as it can yield only imaginary results and create 
distinctions on paper where none exist in fact. 
Perhaps the best evidence of the reasonableness of the Ohs' 
claim for attorney's fees is contained in the "bottom line" of 
the March 14, 1995 Verified Fee Application. Although the Ohs 
were the only parties in this litigation involved in both the 
case in chief and the third party action, their fee claim is 
nearly $12f000.00 less than that of the Umsf the third party 
defendants. 
The Ohs' Application for Attorney's Fees, as presented to 
the District Court on March 14, 1995, is abundantly reasonable. 
The Satsudas are well aware of the extensive work to which Ohs 
were put in defending this claim and advancing the Third Party 
Complaint. Given that the Satsudas are responsible, either 
directly or through their presumed faculties of reasonable 
foreseeability, for all the attorney's fees generated in this 
protracted litigation, they cannot be heard to complain about the 
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inescapable consequences of their own litigiousness. 
THE SATSUDAS' CLAIMS OF FRAUD 
FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The Satsudas assert that the District Court exceeded the 
bounds of its discretion when it determined that the Ohs were not 
liable for fraud in the negotiations and sale of the Capitol 
Motel. The Satsudas maintain on appeal that the Ohs are culpable 
because they fraudulently concealed information about (a) the 
discrepancy between the number of Capitol Motel parking spaces 
and number of rentable rooms; (b) the condition of the Motel's 
plumbing and electrical systems; and ® the construction of seven 
rooms at the Motel without benefit of a Salt Lake City building 
permit. The Satsudas also argue that even if the Ohs did not 
conceal these structural and regulatory deficiencies, they 
nonetheless failed to disclose them anytime prior to the January 
1990 closing. 
A. Fraudulent Concealment. This Court recently addressed 
the tort of fraudulent concealment in the setting of a land sale 
transaction. In Maack v. Resource Design & Construction,. Inc.
 r 
875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994), the Court considered an appeal by 
the purchaser of a private residence who had leveled multiple 
tort claims against both the seller and the builder of his home. 
In the District Court, the purchaser alleged that the seller and 
the builder had either concealed or failed to disclose several 
structural problems that afflicted his residence. That Court 
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granted plenary summary judgment in favor of both defendants on 
all claims. 
In affirming the judgment of the District Court, the Maack 
Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts §550 as its 
working definition of the intentional tort of fraudulent 
concealment. Section 550 declares: 
One party to a transaction who by concealing 
or other action intentionally prevents the 
other from acquiring material information is 
subject to the same liability to the other, 
for pecuniary loss as though he had stated 
the non-existence of the matter that the 
other was thus prevented from discovering. 
Maackr 875 P.2d at 578. Because the purchaser in Maack could not 
support his claim of fraudulent concealment by offering evidence 
that proved the defendants intentionally or actively concealed 
defects in the home, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 
Plaintiff's claim for fraudulent concealment failed as a matter 
of law. Maackf 875 P.2d at 578. 
As in Maack
 r here the Satsudas did not—and could not—show 
that the Ohs intentionally concealed (or even knew of) any defect 
in the Capitol Motel prior to or during the January 1990 sale of 
the Motel. Even if there were a modicum of evidence in the 
record to support such a contention, the Satsudas' claims still 
would fail. Utah law requires a showing by "clear and 
convincing" evidence of all facts that support a claim of fraud. 
Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 1986). Because an 
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essential component of Satsudas1 claim for fraudulent concealment 
against the Ohs is lacking, the claim fails as a matter of law. 
Even if the Satsudas were able to show that the Ohs 
intentionally hid any of the deficiencies of which they complain, 
they still may not recover on a theory of fraudulent concealment. 
As the Court explained in Maackr a purchaser may maintain such a 
claim only where "a careful, reasonable inspection on the part of 
the purchaser would not disclose the defect." Maackf 875 P.2d at 
578 (quoting Atherton Condominium Bd. v. Blume Dev.f 799 P.2d 
250, 261 (Wash. 1990)). The Maack Court's insistence that 
allegedly hidden material information escape a careful, 
reasonable inspection picks up the thread of the Court's ruling 
earlier in the same opinion that the proponent of a claim of 
fraud or misrepresentation must show that it reasonably relied on 
the defendant's false statements. "Fraud as related to [the] 
purchase of real estate may not be predicated on alleged false 
statements the truth of which could have been ascertained with 
reasonable diligence by the party asserting their falsity." 
Maackr 875 P.2d at 577 (citation omitted). Accordingly, for a 
plaintiff to prevail on a claim of misrepresentation, it must 
demonstrate that it took reasonable steps to ascertain the truth 
of the representations at issue or that its reliance on those 
representations, without some further inquiry, was reasonable 
under the circumstances. Id. 
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The record in this case contains no evidence that the 
Satsudas took any steps to investigate the state of affairs that 
underlie their claims of intentional misrepresentation. There is 
no evidence that the Satsudas even inquired about the alleged 
violation of health, safety, or zoning codes on the Capitol Motel 
premises. Nor is there evidence that they retained the services 
of a building inspector to advise them on the Motel's compliance 
with applicable city regulations. Yet this is precisely what the 
Satsudas agreed to do under the terms of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement. Paragraph B of that document provides: 
INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, 
Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said 
property upon Buyerf s own examination and 
judgment and not by reason of any 
representation made by Buyer to Seller or the 
Listing or present value, future value, 
income therefrom or as to its production. 
Buyer accepts the property in "as is" 
condition subject to Seller's warranties as 
outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer 
desires any additional inspection, said 
inspection shall be allowed by Seller but 
arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
(Emphasis added.)4 In addition, under Section l.(e) of the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, the following handwritten text 
appears: "Buyer will inspect more units before acceptance and it 
should be [sic] all operational condition." See Addendum to 
Opening Brief, No. 24. Yet, it is undisputed that the Satsudas 
4 "Section 6" of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement reads as 
follows: "SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained 
in Section C, the following items are also warranted: N/A." See 
Addendum to Opening Brief, No. 24. 
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made only a cursory inspection of the Motel premises and never 
retained a professional inspector to examine the grounds of or 
improvements to commercial real estate for which they were 
willing to part with two-thirds of a million dollars. One may 
conclude from the Satsudas' failure to take even these 
rudimentary steps to protect their $620,000 investment in the 
Capitol Motel that they did not exercise the reasonable diligence 
that must be frustrated by a seller's actions in order to 
maintain a claim of fraudulent concealment. 
B. Fraudulent Failure to Disclose. The Satsudas' claim on 
appeal that the District Court erred in not finding the Ohs 
liable for fraudulently failing to disclose deficiencies in the 
zoning, plumbing and electrical systems, or construction of the 
Capitol Motel also fails as a matter of law. To prevail on this 
cause of action at trial, the Satsudas were required to 
demonstrate that the information that they claim they failed to 
receive was material to their decision to purchase the Capitol 
Motel, See Maackf 875 P.2d at 576-77, and that the information 
was known to the Ohs at the time of that transaction. In 
addition, the Satsudas must show that the Ohs had a legal duty to 
communicate the information to them. First Security Bank v. 
Banberry Development, 786 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 1990); Maackr 875 
P.2d at 578. 
With respect to this last element of a claim of fraudulent 
non-disclosure, it is essential to remember that in Utah, the 
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general rule is that no fiduciary duties run between a buyer and 
seller of real property. Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 
(Utah 1980), superseded by statute on other grounds, 846 P.2d 
1307 (Utah 1993); Schafir v. Harriganr 879 P.2d 1384, 1390; Secor 
v. Knightf 716 P.2d 790, 795 (Utah 1986). The Utah courts have 
recognized a narrow exception to this broad rule. In Banberry 
Development
 r the Utah Supreme Court adopted the position of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §551(2)(b) that: 
One party to a business transaction is under 
a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
disclose to [another party] before the 
transaction is consummated...matters known to 
him that he knows to be necessary to prevent 
his partial or unambiguous statement of facts 
from being misleading. 
Banberry Development, 786 P.2d at 1330-31. This duty of 
disclosure arises, whoever, only where a defect in the premises 
being sold is not discoverable by reasonable care. Banberry 
Development, 786 P.2d at 1331; Maackr 875 P.2d at 579. Moreover, 
the doctrine of caveat emptor, which applies to the sale of used 
commercial property in Utah, Schafir, 879 P.2d at 1388-89, bars a 
claim of failure to disclose even latent defects because it is 
assumed that the buyer has a reasonable opportunity to inspect 
the premises. Id.; compare Maackr 875 P.2d at 583 (caveat emptor 
applies to the sale of used residential property). As pointed 
out above, there is no evidence in the record that the Satsudas 
made any inquiry, reasonable or otherwise, into any of the 
deficiencies that they claim afflict the Capitol Motel before 
070\JW8\OH-SATSU\APP-OPPO.BRF 
93-189.2 
4/18/96 34 
purchasing that real property and its improvements. Accordingly, 
the District Court properly refused to fasten liability on the 
Ohs for the consequences of those deficiencies under a theory of 
fraudulent failure to disclose. 
THE OHS CARRIED OUT THEIR OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
The Satsudas next argue on appeal that the District Court 
erred as a matter of law in concluding that the Ohs were not 
liable for breach of the warranties set out in paragraph C of the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement of November 16, 1989. See ROA, V.4 
at 1467, 1650. In that clause of the Earnest Money Agreement, 
the Ohs warranted to the Satsudas that they had received no claim 
or notice of building or zoning violations, that all obligations 
in the form of taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens and other 
encumbrances were current before closing, and that the plumbing, 
hearing, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical 
systems, and appliances in the Capitol Motel were in satisfactory 
working condition at closing. See Addendum to Opening Brief, No. 
24 at 1. In the Satsudas' view, the deficiencies in a portion of 
the Motel's plumbing and electrical systems evidences a breach of 
the warranties extended to them under paragraph C. Opening Brief 
at 30-34. 
The Satsudas1 breach of warranty theory fails to account for 
the doctrine of merger that applies in the sale of commercial 
real property and improvements. The Utah Supreme Court has 
explained the workings of that doctrine's mechanism as follows: 
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The doctrine of merger...is applicable when 
the acts to be performed by the seller in a 
contract relate only the delivery of title to 
the buyer• Execution and delivery of a deed 
by the seller then usually constitute full 
performance on [the seller's] part, and 
acceptance of the deed by the buyer manifests 
his acceptance of that performance even 
though the estate conveyed may differ from 
that promised I the antecedent agreement. 
Therefore, in such a case, the deed is the 
final agreement and all prior terms, whether 
written or verbal, are extinguished and 
unenforceable. 
Stubbs v. Hemmertr 567 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1977) (footnotes 
omitted, emphasis added). 
The vitality and effect of the doctrine of merger was 
affirmed in Schafir v. Harriganr 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994), 
a case whose facts are remarkably similar to those underlying 
this case. In Schafir the plaintiffs (the Schafirs) brought a 
claim of breach of warranty against the defendants (the 
Harrigans), contending that the Harrigans had breached the terms 
of paragraph C of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement that the 
parties had executed. Citing the Utah Supreme Court's statement 
of the doctrine in Stubbsr the Court of Appeals concluded that 
the doctrine of merger extinguished the terms of an Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement and elevated the subsequently executed warranty 
deed to the status of final, binding agreement between buyer and 
seller. Schafir, 879 P.2d at 1392. Because the Schafirs had 
accepted a warranty deed for their property, the Court concluded 
that they were barred as a matter of law from arguing that the 
Harrigans had breached the warranties of paragraph C in the 
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Earnest Money Sales Agreement unless they could show that the 
warranties on which they were relied were carried forward through 
the warranty deed or otherwise survived the delivery and 
acceptance of the deed. Id. Observing that the warranties 
preserved in a warranty deed do not include notice of building 
code violations, the Schafir Court affirmed the District Court' s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Harrigans. Id. 
The merger doctrine recognizes several exceptions,, including 
fraud and the existence of collateral rights in a contract of 
sale. Embassy Group Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1371-72 (Utah 
App. 1993 ). 5 Proof of fraud precludes invocation of the 
doctrine. But as the Utah Supreme Court has explained, in order 
to prevail on a claim of fraud, all of the elements of that tort 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Secor v. 
Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 794 (Utah 1986); Embassy Group Inc., 865 
P.2d at 1371. The collateral rights exception bars merger only 
where "the seller's performance involves some act collateral to 
the conveyance of title, with the result that those obligations 
'survive the deed and are not extinguished by it.1" Embassy 
Group Inc., 865 P.2d at 1372 (quoting Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 
168, 169 (Utah 1977)). Thus if a preliminary land sales contract 
contains terms that are collateral to the conveyance of title, 
5 The doctrine also recognizes exceptions for mutual 
mistake in drafting and ambiguity in the final documents. Maynard 
v. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah App. 1996). Neither of these 
exceptions has been put at issue in this appeal. 
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those terms will survive the delivery of a warranty deed to 
buyer. Embassy Group Inc., 865 P.2d at 1372. Terms in a land 
sale contract that relate to the title of the property conveyed 
or encumbrances on that title "are not considered to be 
collateral because they relate to the same subject matter as the 
deed." Secorf 716 P.2d at 793. 
Here the Satsudas find themselves in the same situation as 
the plaintiffs in Schafir. They are attempting (and attempted at 
trial) to invoke certain warranties memorialized in an Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement. But as the Court in Schafir concluded, 
the entirety of such an agreement is extinguished by the 
subsequent delivery of a warranty deed to the buyer of the 
property. Accordingly, the Satsudas fare no better than the 
plaintiffs in Schafir: their cause of action for breach of 
warranty fails as a matter of law. Moreover, neither the 
exception for fraud or collateral rights bars the application of 
merger in this case. As the Ohs demonstrated above, the Satsudas 
may not maintain their twin claims of intentional 
misrepresentation (read: fraud) as a matter of law. Nor can the 
Satsudas point to any evidence in the record of this case that 
proves the warranties of paragraph C of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement were not directly tied to the Ohs1 obligation under the 
Warranty Deed to convey title to the Capitol Motel. Because 
neither of these exceptions barred the application of the 
doctrine of merger in this case, the Earnest Money Sales 
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Agreement ceased to exist on or about January 5, 1990 and was not 
available at trial as a foundation for the Satsudas' claim of 
breach of warranty. 
THE SALE OF THE CAPITOL MOTEL AT A PROFIT 
FOLLOWING COMMENCEMENT OF THIS SUIT NEGATES 
SATSUDAS1 CLAIM FOR SPECIAL DAMAGES. 
The Satsudas also find error in the District Court1 s refusal 
to award them compensation for the special damages that they 
allegedly incurred to correct electrical and plumbing problems in 
several of the Capitol Motel' s rooms. Opening Brief at 34-36. 
According to the Satsudas the cost of these repairs totaled 
$37,281.00. Id. at 35. As a preliminary matter, the Ohs 
register their objection to the appearance of this issue in the 
Satsudas' Opening Brief. As was pointed out above, this issue 
was not listed in the Satsudasf Docketing Statement nor was it 
specified in the Satsudas1 various Notices of Appeal. Seer for 
example, ROA V. 4 at 1832-33. 
The Satsudas claim for an award of the "special damages" 
that they allegedly incurred to make repairs to the Capitol Motel 
offers this Court absolutely no legal foundation on which to base 
any relief from the final judgment of the District Court. First, 
the entire claim rests exclusively on the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement executed by and between the Satsudas and the Ohs on 
November 16, 1989. But as the Satsudas argue strenuously in 
their Opening Brief in opposition to the Ohsf claim for attorneys 
fees, Opening Brief at 14-17, that Agreement went out of 
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existence on January 5, 1990, due to the execution of the Ohs' 
Warranty Deed on that date.6 How is it that the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement has no existence when an award of the Ohsf 
attorney's fees is at issue yet retains vitality as a legal 
predicate for the Satsudas' claim for special damages? As this 
Court has held repeatedly, see, for example, Schafir, 879 P.2d at 
1392, the doctrine of merger extinguishes the terms of an earnest 
money sales agreement upon the execution of a warranty deed 
between a buyer and a seller. 
Nor can there be any bona fide assertion that any of the 
recognized exceptions to the abrogation of an earnest money sales 
agreement came into play to preserve past the date of closing an 
obligation on the part of the Ohs to ensure that the Capitol 
Motel's plumbing and electrical systems satisfied Salt Lake City 
building codes. As was shown above, this notion was expressly 
rejected by this Court in Schafir. See id., 879 P.2d at 1392. 
Though its origins are uncertain, the Satsudas' claim for 
special damages appears to be grounded in the premise that the 
Capitol Motel was worth less than what they paid for it in the 
January 5, 1990 sale. In other words, the Satsudas are 
attempting to claim on appeal that the District Court denied them 
damages rooted in a theory of "loss of the bargain." 
Assuming for purposes of responding to this theory that the 
Satsudas actually made repairs to the Capitol Motel, they still 
The Ohs agree. See supra at 34-37. 
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were barred from recovering those costs at trial. Where, as here, 
real property that is the subject of a "loss of the bargain" 
claim appreciates in value, Utah law declares that the 
appreciation negates the claimantf s entitlement to damages for 
loss of advantageous bargain. In Soffe v. Riddf 659 P.2d 1082 
(Utah 1983), the plaintiff (Soffe) sold a house to the defendant 
(Ridd) under a Uniform Real Estate Contract and then sued to 
recover possession of the property and terminate the contract 
when Ridd defaulted. Id. at 1083. Soffe sought to retain 
$20,725 paid under the contract by Ridd as liquidated damages. 
Id. Ridd counterclaimed seeking to avoid the contractual 
forfeiture of all monies paid under the contract on grounds of 
unconscionability. Id. Ridd prevailed on his counterclaim in 
the District Court based on the Courtf s determination that Soffe 
did not sustain the loss of an advantageous bargain. Id. at 
1083-84. Soffe appealed the District Court's refusal to 
literally enforce the liquidated damages provision. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of 
Soffefs loss of bargain claim: 
The plaintiff produced no evidence that the 
property had diminished in value. Mr. Ridd, 
one of the buyers, testified that when he and 
his wife vacated, the property was worth a 
substantial amount more than the contract 
price.... 
Id. at 1085. (Emphasis added.) Thus, without evidence of actual 
diminution in value, loss of bargain damages are not recoverable. 
Similarly, in Bellon v. Malnarr 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991), the 
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plaintiff's assignee entered into a real estate contract to 
purchase from defendant Malnar 76 acres of land together with 
water stock for $152,000. Id. at 1091. Malnar subsequently 
claimed a default and obtained possession of the property. The 
plaintiff subsequently brought an action against Malnar for 
"equitable restitution" of the down payment and the installments 
which were forfeited to Malnar. Id. at 1092. At trial, the 
plaintiff presented evidence that the property was worth 
$180,000. Id. 
The District Court first computed Malnarfs offsetting 
damages resulting from the default by initially subtracting the 
total amount paid in principal, $50,080.65, from $152,000, the 
contract price, leaving $101,919. The District Court then added 
$10,247 for accrued interest due when the default occurred and 
$1,774 for delinquent real property taxes and water assessments 
and thus calculated the balance owing to Malnar at the time of 
the default at $113,941. Id. at 1092. Continuing the 
calculation to arrive at a decision on plaintiff's equitable 
restitution claim, the trial court then subtracted that balance, 
$113,941, from the total amount in value that Malnar had received 
at the forfeiture, $185,075 (the trial court found $5,075 in 
extra value forfeited in addition to the $180,000 value of the 
property) and awarded judgment against Malnar in favor of 
plaintiffs in the sum of $71,133. Id. Malnar appealed. 
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The Supreme Court held that the District Court had erred in 
its calculation of offsetting damages: 
The contract price of the property was 
$152,000. The value of the property, 
including the disputed 6 acres, at forfeiture 
was $180,000. Malnar is not entitled to loss 
of the bargain damages when the property has 
appreciated in value. 
IiL, at 1096 (citing Soffe v. Riddr 659 P.2d at 1085). 
Other jurisdictions are in accord with this rule. In Yank 
v. Juhrend, 729 P.2d 941 (Ariz. App. 1986), a case strikingly 
similar to this one, a purchaser of land brought an action for 
recision and loss of the bargain damages, claiming that the land 
he had purchased had been illegally subdivided by the seller. As 
here, the factual basis of the claim was failure of the seller to 
conform with municipal codes and ordinances. However, the 
plaintiff, Yank, testified that the property had appreciated in 
value. Id. at 943. Based on that testimony, the Arizona Court 
of Appeals succinctly ruled that "because Yank testified at the 
hearing on the preliminary injunction that the property was then 
worth...more than the purchase price, he was not entitled to any 
damages." Id. (Emphasis added.) 
In Harris v. Shell Development Corporation Nevada Inc.r 594 
P.2d 731 (Nev. 1979), the vendor of an apartment complex brought 
an action against the purchaser and the escrow agent for breach 
of contract. The purchaser cross-claimed against the escrow 
agent. Id. at 732-33. Based upon a finding of fact that the 
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market value of the land at the time of the purchaser's breach 
was higher than the purchase price, the Nevada court held: 
Generally, where the purchaser breaches an 
executory real estate contract, the vendor is 
entitled to recover damages measured by the 
difference between the contract price and the 
market value of the land on the date of 
breach (citation omitted). Where, as here, 
the market value of the land at the time of 
the breach is higher than the purchase price, 
the vendor is entitled to only nominal 
damages plus provable consequential damages. 
Id^ at 734. 
With respect to special damages, the Utah Supreme Court, in 
Soffe v. Riddr 659 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1983), affirmed without 
comment the District Court's ruling that the seller did not 
sustain a loss of an advantageous bargain and that she was not 
entitled to an offset for improvements which she made after 
retaking possession which put the premises in better condition 
than they were in at the time the buyers took possession. Id. at 
1083-84, 1085. In other words, and contrary to the holding in 
Harris, the Utah courts apply the rule that such special/ 
consequential damages are "absorbed" into the property' s 
appreciated value. 
In this case, Judge Frederick, sitting as the finder of 
fact, was not called on to speculate about the appreciated value 
of the Capitol Motel or rely upon approximations, such as 
appraisals. Here, the optimal finder of fact as to value, the 
marketplace of willing buyers and sellers, rendered its "verdict" 
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in the form of an actual, arms-length market sale. After all, 
the best measure of value of property is what a willing buyer 
will pay to a willing seller under non-distressed circumstances. 
Clearly, the marketplace proved the Satsudas' damages to be 
illusory. The marketplace declared that the alleged defects in 
the plumbing and electrical systems had no measurable adverse 
effect on the value of the Capitol Motel. Accordingly, the 
Satsudasf Mloss of bargain" special damages claims fail as a 
matter of law against the setting of undisputed facts in this 
record. 
CONCLUSION 
In the preceding Brief, The Ohs have shown that each and 
every issue raised by the Satsudas either ignores the evidence 
put before the District Court or has no basis in law. For these 
reasons, the Ohs respectfully ask this Court to affirm the Final 
Judgment of the District Court in all respects. 
go. DATED this
 t*LJ- day of May, 1996, 
PURSER EDWARDS & SHIELDS, L.L.C. 
/ 
for Defendants, Third-
faint i f fs and Appellees 
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ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF HASIN OH AND MYUN6 JA OH 
Trial Exhibits (all three of the following documents were 
included in Trial Exhibit No. 8) 
1. Deed Of Trust With Assignment of Rents, January 5, 
1990. 
2. Uniform Real Estate Contract, May 1, 1987 
3. Assignment of Contract, January 5, 1990 
Tabl 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO 
r 1 
Name H a s i n Oh 
Address 4 7 6 South State Street 
OtyO Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
State 
L J 
-SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDERS USE — 
DEED OF TRUST 
WITH ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 
This Deed of Trust, made this 5 t h
 day of January l 0 90 between 
WAYNE TAKASHI SATSUDA a n d SEON SIL SATSUDA, h i s w i f e
 a8 T R U S T O R . 
whose address is 1749 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t , S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 5 
(Street and number) (City) (State) 
ASSOCIATED TITLE CO.
 a u u h corporfttion. ft3 TRUSTEE, and HASIN OH a n d MYUNG JA OH 
h i s w i f e , a s j o i n t t e n a n t s ;
 M B E N E F I C I A R Y > 
W i t n e s s e s : That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST. WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described 
property, situated in S a l t L a k e
 C o u n t y r S t a t c o ( u t a h : 
Beginning at a point 5 feet North of the Northwest Corner of 
Lot 28, Block 2, Dankowske Park, a Subdivision of Lot 10, Block 
5, Five Acre Plat "A", Big Field Survey, and running thence 
South 211.4 feet; thence East 121.5 feet; thence North 211.4 
feet; thence West 121.5 feet; to the point of beginning. 
Subject to a right of way 50 feet wide for road and incidental 
purposes which lies within the bounds of Wilson Avenue. 
Together with all building*, flxlurea and Improvementa thereon and all water rlghti. righti of way. eaaemenu. rent*. Isaue*. profit*. Income, tenement*, 
hereditament*, privilege* and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof. SUBJECT, 
HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply «uch rents, Issues, and profit*. 
For the Purpose of Securing: 
(1) payment of the Indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even date hereof In the principal »om of $ i d — I — U U * U U > 
made by Truttor, payable to the ord»r of Beneficiary at the time*, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or re-
newals or modification* thereof, (2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or ad-
vances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or nls successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting that they are secured 
by this Deed of Trust; and (4) the payment of oil sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the 'erms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided 
I 
To Protect The Security of This Deed of Trust, Trustor Agiees- i 
1 To keep said property in good condition and repair, not to remove or demolish any building thereon, to complete or restore promptly and In ! 
good ond workmanlike manner ony building which may be constructed damaged or destroyed thereon to comply with all laws covenants and reitrlc 
tions affecting said property, not to commit or permit waste thereof not to commit suffer or permit ony act upon said property in violation of law, to j 
do all other acts which from the character or use of said property may be reasonably necessary the specific enumerations herein not excluding the ' 
general, and, if the loan secured hereby or any part thereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on satd property ' 
Trustor further agrees 
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable diligence to .ompletion in accordance with plans ond spec! j 
fications satisfactory to Beneficiary, ard 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at ail times during construction I 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of on affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facts showing a default by Trustor under this numbered para ' 
graph, is authorized to accept as true and conclusive all facts and statements therein, and to act thereon hereunder 
2 To provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on the Irrprovemenfs now existing or here-
after erected or placed on said property Such insurance shall be carried in companies approved by Beneficiary with loss payable douses in favor of and 
in form acceptable to Beneficiary In the event of lost. Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may make proof of loss, and each insurance | 
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment for such loss directly to Beneficiary, instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, 
and the Insurance proceeds, or any part thereof, may be applied by Beneficiary, at its option, to the reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to 
the restoration or repair of the property damaged In the event that the Trustor shall fall to provide satisfactory hazard Insurance the Beneficiary may 
procure, on the Trustor's behalf, Insurance In 'cvor of the Beneficiary alone If insurance cannot be secured by the Trustor to provide the required cover-
age, this will constitute an act of default under the terms of this Deed of Trust 
3 To deliver to, pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full such evidence of title as Beneficiary 
may require, including abstracts of title or policies of title insurance and any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto 
A To appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to said property, or the rights or powers of 
Beneficiary or Trustee, and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to appear in or defend any such action or proceeding to pay all costs and expenses in-
eluding cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees In a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee 
5 To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, including all assessments upon water company 
stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or used In connection with said property; to pay, when due, all encumbrances 
charges, and liens with interest, on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto to pay all costs fees, 
and expenses of this Trust 
6 To pay to Beneficiary monthly. In advance, an amount, as estimated by Beneficiary in its discretion sufficient to pay all taxes ond assessments 
affecting said property, and all premiums on insurance therefor, as and when the same shall become due 
7 Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided then Beneficiary or Trustee, but without obligation so to do and 
without notice to or demand upon Trustor ond without releasing Trustor from any obligation heroof mayi Make or do the same in such manner and 
to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof. Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said property for such 
purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or 
Trustee, pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto 
and In exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor, including 
cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and puy his reasonable fees 
8 To pay Immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with inteiest from date of expenditure at 
the rate of 10% per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured hereby. 
9 To pay to Beneficiary a "late charge" of not to exceed five cents (5{) for each One Dollar ($1 00) of each payment due hereunder or due pur* 
suant to the aforesaid promissory note el even date hereof which Is more than fifteen (15) days In arreari This payment shall be made to cover the 
extra expense involved in handling delinquent payments 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THATi 
10 Should said properly or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement or condemnation proceeding, or damaged 
by fire, or earthquake, or In any other manner, Beneficiary shall be entitled to all compensation, awards, ond other poyments or relief therefor, and 
shall be entitled at Its option to commence, appear in and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or settle-
ment. In connection with such taking or damage All such compensation, awards, damages rights of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any 
policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property, are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after deducting therefrom all Its expenses. 
Including attorney's fees, apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any compensation, 
award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds at Beneficiary or Trustee may require 
11 At any time and from time to time upon written request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of this Deed of Trust and the note 
for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and retention) without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebted-
ness secured hereby, and without releasing the interest of any party joining in this Deed of Trust, Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or 
plat of said property, (b) join in granting any easement or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this 
Deed of Trust or the lien or charge thereof, (d) grant any extension or modification of the terms of this loan; (e) reconvey, without warranty, all or any 
part of said property. The grantee in any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any 
matters or fads shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof Trustor agrees to pay reasonable trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in 
this paragraph 
12 As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns to Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all rents. Issues, royalties, and profits of 
the property affected by this Deed of Trust and of any personal property located thereon Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness 
secured hereby or In the performance of ony agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, and profits 
earned prior to default as they become due and payable If Trustor shall default as aforesaid. Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease 
and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties. Issues, and profits 
Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from lime to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any manner affect the subsequent en-
forcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary 
to collect, shall be, or be construed to be, an" affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a sub-
ordination of the lien or charge of this Deed of Trusi to any such tenancy, lease or option 
13 Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at any lime without notice, either in person, by agent, or by a receiver to be ap-
pointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as such receiver), ond without regard to the adequacy of any security 
for the Indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof. In its own name sue for or otherwise collect 
said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less costs and expens s of operation and collection, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, upon ony indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine 
14 The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collection of such rents, issues, and profits, or the proceeds of fire and other 
Insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or damage of said property, and the application or release thereof os aforesaid, shall 
not cure or waive any default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice 
13 The failure on the part of Beneficiary fo promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate a . a waiver of such right and the waiver by 
Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a v/aiver of any other or subsequent default 
16 Time Is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor ,n the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or In the performance of any 
agreement hereunder, all sum. secured hereby shall Immediately become due and payable ai the option of Beneficiary In the event of such defcult 
Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be sold to sat.sfy the obllg-' 
t.oni hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record ,n each county wherein said property or some part or parcel thereof is situated Benef.clary 
also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing expenjilures secured hereby 
17 After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law following the recordation of said notice of default, and notice of default and 
notice of sale hoving been given os then required by low, Trustee without demand on Trustor shall sell said property on the date and at the time 
and place designated In said notice of sale, either as a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as It may determine (but subject fo any satutory 
right of Trustor to direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels shall be sold), at public auction to the highest 
bidder, the purchase price paynble in lawful money of the United States at the lime of sale The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he 
deems expedient, postpone tSe sole from time to time until It shall be completed and. in every such 'ase -lotice of postponement sha'l be g ver> b / 
pub'lc d.ctarjflor thereof by .uch penon at the I.me ond place irst appointed for the sale; provided if the sale n postponed for longer than one day 
beyond the day designated In the notice of sale, noflee thereof shall be given In the same manner as the original notice of tale. Trustee shall execute 
and deliver to the purchaser Its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant of warranty express or Implied The recitals In the Deed 
of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof Any person, including Beneficiary may bid at the sale Trustee shall apply 
the proceeds of the sale to payment of ( I ) the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale including the payment of the Trustee's 
and attorney's fees/ (2) cost of any evidence of title procured In connection with such sale and rmwnv stamps on Trustees Deed; (3) all sums expended 
under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued Interest o i l 0 % par annum from date of expenditure, (4) all qther turns then secured hereby; 
and (5* the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee m its discretion may deposit the balance of such pro-
ceeds with the County Clerk of the county In whicS the sale took place 
18 Trustor agrees to surrender possession of the hereinabove described Trust property to the Purchaser at the aforesaid sale. Immediately after 
such safe, In the event such possession has not previously been surrendered by Trustor 
19 Upon the occurence of any default hemundtr Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums tecured hereby immediately dv« and pay-
able and foreclose this Deed of Trust In the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled 
fo recover in such proceedings all costs and expenses Incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney « fee in iwch amount as shall be fixed by the court 
20 Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at ony time by filing for record in the office of the County Recorder of each county in which said 
property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee from the time the substitution is filed for record the new trustee shall succeed to 
all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee Each such substitution shall be executed and acknowl-
edged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made in the manner provided by law 
21 This Deed of Trust shall apply to. Inure to the benefit of, and bind all parlies hereto, their heirs legatees devisees, administrators executors, 
successors and assigns All obligations of Trustor hereunder are |omt ond several The term "Beneficiary shall mean the owner and holder, including 
any pledgee, of the note secured hereby In this Deed of Trust, whenever the context so requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, 
ond the singular number includes the plural. 
22 Trustee accepts this Trust when this Deed of Trust, duly executed ond acknowledged. Is made a public record os provided by law Trustee is not 
obligated fo notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other Deed of Trust or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary or Trustee 
shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
23 This Deed of Trust shall be construed according fo the laws of the State of Utah 
24. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale hereunder be mailed to him at fhe address herein-
before set forth 
Signature of Trustor 
VJQMfttl l&ktLsL S s f e u j * 
ATSUDA 
SATSUDA 
STATE OF UTAH 1 
county of S a l t Lake j M 
On t h « 5 £ 2 l _ _ day of J a n u a r y
 kX> "> 9 0 personally appeared before me W a y n e T a K S S h J 
fiafcanda and Sfion fill Safcsuda 
the slgner.g_ of the within Instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that u f i e y executed the same 
My Commission expires 0 ~ 1 9 " 9 1 
tfotary Pubhc^rl/ktd*»g-'at 
STATE OF UTAH 1
 u Salf-^kg County, Utah 
County of J 
On the day of . A D 19 personally appeared before me . 
and j who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself that he the said . 
Is the President, and he, the said , Is the Secretary 
of , and that the within and foregoing Instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by 
authority of a resolution of Its Board of Directors, and said , and 
each duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed Is the seal of said corporation 
My Commission expires 
Tab 2 
/WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: 
SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER 
CAUTION: READ BEFORE YOU SIGN 
This is a legally binding contract, if you Jo not understand it, seek legal advice be/ore i ou sign 
This contract is intended to be filled in b\ lawyers or by real estate brokers All others seek projessional advue 
To assure protection of tertatn priority rights in the property, u is recommended thut this t outrun und an\ u\signments or 
addenda, be recorded in the offue of the applicable County Recorder. 
IJNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
1. Parties. This contract, made and entered into this i s t day of May, l9q_L. 
by and between Kee Hong Urn and Shi Ja Urn, husband and w i f e , as l o i n t tenants 
(hereafter collectively called "Seller"), whose address is 1387 E a s t BlOSSOtU D r i v e , Sandy , Utah 84092 
and Hasin Oh and Myung Ja Oh, husband and w i f e , a s j o i n t tenants 
(hereafter collectively called "Buyer"), whose address «s 1088 Fairhaven C i r c l e , Murray, Utah 84123 
2. Property. Seller agrees to sell and Buyer agrees to buy the real property (the "Property") located at 
1749 South State Street 
. (street address), in the City of . Salt Lake 
County of Salt Lake State of Utah, described as Beginning at a point 5 feet North 
of the Northwest comer of Lot 28, Block 2, DANKOWSKE PARK, a subdivision of Lot 10, Block £ 
Five Acre Plat "A", Big Field Survey, and running thence Sonth 211.4 feet; thence Fast 121.f 
feet:;, thence North .211.4,feet; thence West 121.^ feet to the point of beginning.—Subject tc 
wiisS Avlnui^ ^ ^eet Wlc^e f° r road and incidental purposes which lies within the bounds oi 
3. Dale of Possession. Seller agrees to deliver possession and Buyer agrees to enter into possession of the Propen> on the 
— 1 s t day of May. 19 8 7 . . 
4. Price and Payment. 
A. Buyer agrees to pay for the Property the purchase pr.ee of Five Hundred Forty Thousand and no/100 
"Dollars (S 5 4 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 )
 p a y a b | c ai Seller's address above given, 
or to Seller's order on the following terms F i f t y TtlQUSand and n o / M O -
' Dollars 
(S 5Q,QQQ.Q0 ) down payment, receipt ol which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of FOIIT Hundred N i n e t y 
Thousand and n o / i n n - Dollars 
(S .490 ,000 . f l f l ) to be paid as follows. 
Ihe sum of $4,728.65, principal and interest, shall be paid to the sellers hereunder 
on or before the 1st day of June, 1987, with the sum of $4,728.65, principal and interest, 
due to the sellers hereunder on or before the 1st day of each succeeding month thereafter, 
until the entire principal balance, together with accrued interest, has been paid in full. 
In addition to the monthly payments as outlined hereunder, buyers will pay a balloon 
payment, in the amount of $50,000.00, to be applied towards the outstanding principal 
balance, on or before May 1, 1991. 
B. Payments shall include interest at the rate of ~ * percent (— z l %) per annum on the 
unpaid principal balance from the date of May 1 , 1987 . Any payment not made within F i f t e e n (-15 ) da> s at 
its due date shall subject Buyer to a late payment charge of F j y g percent (JU3 %) of such overdue payment, which 
charge must be paid before receiving credit for the late payment. The loregoing payments include a reserve lor paymem ol [-) taxes f- ] 
insurance [-jcondofees [-j other (explain) (Buyer t o pay t a x e s and hazard insurance premiums as the same 
become d u e and p r o v i d e e x i d p n r p o f t h p i r paympnt t o f h p s p l l p r h p r p n n d p r . l 
Initially, the reserve amount per payment ^ -QQ In the ivent reserve payments on underlying obligations lor the Propert) 
change, Seller shall give Buyer thirty (30) days written notice of change, and reserve payments herein shall be adjusted accordingly. 
This form is approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the Office of the Attorney General. January I. 1987. 
FORM 106 • G«m Printing Co. Salt Lake City 
C. All payments made by Buyer shall be applied first to payment of late charges, next to Seller's payment under Section 12. \ 
interest as provided therein, next to the payment of reserves if any, next to the payment of interest, and then to the reduction oi principal. Hi 
may, at Buyer's option, pay amounts in excess of the periodic payments herein provided, and such excess shall he applied io unpaid princ 
unless Buyer elects in writing at the time of such payment that it shall be applied as prepayment of future installments. In the event ol . 
prepayment by Buyer, Buyer shall assume and pay all penalties incurred by Seller in making accelerated payments on any uiulerly 
obligations. 
D. When the unpaid principal balance owing under this contract is equal to or less than the total balance outstanding on 
underlying obligation(s) shown in Section X below, then: 
(1) Upon (i) assumption by Buyer of the underlying obligation(s) and (ii) release of Seller from all liabilities and obligatit 
thereunder. Buyer may request and Seller shall execute and deliver a Warranty Deed subject to the then existing underlying obligation(s) slu» 
in Section 8 below; or 
(2) Provided there is no "duc-on-sale" provision contained in any underlying obligaiion(s) shown in Section s below, Scl 
may execute and deliver to Buyera Warranty Deed subject to the then existing underlying obligation(s) shown in Sections below, which Bu> 
agrees to assume and pay; or * '" ~ 
(3) In the event neither Buyer nor Seller exercises the options provided in (I) and (2) of this sub-section, anil this contra 
therefore remains in effect, then the payments and interest rate shown in this Section, to the extent they differ from the underlying obligation 
shall immediately and automatically be adjusted to equal the payments and interest rale then required under the underlying obligations, ai 
Buyer, in addition to such adjusted payments, shall also pay a monthly servicing fee to Seller m the amount of $ JJQ 
5. No Waiver. If Seller accepts payments from Buyer on this contract in an amount less than or at a time later than herein pro\idci 
such acceptance will not constitute a modification of this contract or a waiver of Seller's rights to full and timely performance by Buyer. 
6. Risk of Loss. All risk of loss and destruction of the Properly shall be borne by Seller until the agreed date of possession. 
7. Evidence of Title. Buyer has received a Commitment for Title Insurance (Commitment) on the Property at the time ol or prion* 
execution of this contract. Seller shall, at his expense, furnish Buyer evidence of marketable title in the form of an Owner's Title Insurance Polio 
(Title Policy) insuring Buyer's interest in the Property under this contract for the amount of the purchase price. The Title Policy will be based oi 
Commitment No &657Q6 issued hy A s s o c i a t e d T i t l e C o . The Till e Policy issued io Buyer will contain the following 
numbered exceptions shown on the Commitment: 1 t h r o u g h and i n c l u d i n g 1 4 . 
K. Underlying Obligations. 
A. Seller warrants that the only underlying obligations against the Property are: 
(1) Obligation in favor of C!> Vernon T^nglo- i s
 a n d ftnth P . Tang lcr i s and J^ry ,t5tfflTY)1n1 i S 
with an unpaid principal balance of Twenty-one Thousand Four Hundred Forty- three and 34/100 Dollars 
($21 ,443 .34— ) a s o f Apri l 30,, , m87 wiihmi.iiihiyP.-.ym.Mii<i.r< 800.00 w„i,interest a(_flve_&_Qne-
percent ( sLiIL-%) per annum and balloon payments us follows: n o n e . 
(2) Obligation in favor of Vernon L. Peterson and LaVie Peterson 
($68 1751135 )asof A p r i l 3Q,, I9&7 with monthly payments o fSA, 1 4 5 , 0 0 , with interest a t -Saven 
percent ( 2JJ3 %) per annum and balloon payments as follows: none*. 
(3) Obligation in favor of ftahrvv* and Pnrrtrvmy, Tnnig W. T^Vvv-v^ Pr^c-j^pp-h 
with an unpaid principal balance ^ H n ^ Hnndr^H Tflin<M-o<an T^nm ganrl f u n Hiy-irjrorl Pi ff-y-fniTr ap/1 8?/1 finIMILUN 
(S H 9 1 2 5 4 . 8 2 j
 a s rtf A p r i l 3 0 , 19 £ 7 with monthly payments ofS l i 4 £ Q i Q 9 with interest at - T e n 
percent ( —Q*Q—%) per annum and balloon payments as follows: n o n e , 
B. COPIES OF SUCH UNDERLYING OBLIGATIONS*! HAVE. J HAVE NOT BEEN DELIVERED TO nUYER AT OR 
PRIOR TO .CLOSING. SUCH UNDERLYING OBLIGATIONS! ] CONTAIN fcc] DO NOT CONTAIN DUE ON SALE Ok DUE ON 
ENCUMBRANCE PROVISIONS. 
C. IN THE EVENT THE HOLDER OF ANY UNDERLYING OBLIGATION(S) REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION A. 
CAUSES TO BE ISSUED A WRITTEN NOTICE OF ITS INTENT TO EXERCISE ANY OF THE DUE ON SALE REMEDIES, THEN 
BUYER AGREES TO EITHER PAY, ASSUME OR REFINANCE SUCH UNDERLYING OBI.IGATION(S) IN THE MANNER 
PROVIDED BELOW, AND BUYER AGREES TO PAY ALL COSTS, FEES AND CHARGES INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH 
SUCH PAYMENT, ASSUMPTION OR REFINANCING (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PREPAYMENT PENALTIES, 
LOAN POINTS, INCREASED INTEREST RATE, APPRAISAL AND CREDIT REPORT FEES, ESCROW AND TITLE CHARGES, 
TITLE INSURANCE PREMIUMS, AND RECORDING FEES). BUYER'S INABILITY OR FAILURE TO PAY, ASSUME, OR 
REFINANCE SUCH UNDERLYING OBLIGATION(S) WITHIN FORTY-FIVE (45) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF NOTICE TO 
BUYER OF SUCH WRITTEN NOTICE FROM THE HOLDER, SHALL CONSTITUTE A DEFAULT BY BUYER UNDER THIS 
CONTRACT. 
(I) Assumption. In the event buyer elects to assume such underlying obligation^). Buyer shall be entitled to the delivery of a 
Warranty Deed executed by the Seller wherein the Buyer is the Grantee upon the satisfaction of the following conditions precedent: (i) Buyer is 
not then in default under the terms of this contract; (ii) Buyer has deposited with Seller written evidence from the holder of the underlying 
obligaiion(s) being assumed that such holder has approved Buyer's assumption; and (iii) if any portion of the Seller's equity undei this contract 
remains unpaid. Buyer shall execute and deliver to Seller. Buyer's Trust Deed Noteina principal amount equal to the unpaid balance ol Seller's 
equity under this contract, which shall include any accrued unpaid interest. Said note shall bear interest from the date thereof at the same rate at 
which interest accrues on the Seller's equity under this contract. Installments shall be made over the term then remaining and at the same tune as 
provided for in this contract with the exact amount of the installments being calculated by re-amortising the aforesaid; 
amount of the Trust Deed Note ulilizir;: the interest rate at which interest accrues on Seller's equity under this contract, the schedule of 
payments, and term specified herein. Such note shall be secured by a Deed of Trust encumbering the property which shall be subordinate only to 
the Deed or Deeds of Trust securing the underlying obligation(s) and any obligations refinanced as provided in sub-section C.(2). 
(2) Refinancing/Pay-Out. In the event Buyer pays or obtains a new loan refinancing one or more of the underlying 
obligations, then buyer shall be entitled to the delivery of a Warranty Deed executed by the Seller wherein the Buyer is Grantee; provided. 
however, if any portion of the seller's equity remains unpaid, then the following conditions precedent shall have been satisfied: (i) Buyer is not 
then in default under any of the terms of this Contract; (ii) the principal amount of the new loan may exceed the unpaid balance ol "the underlying 
obligation(s) being refinanced only if all loan proceeds which exceed the unpaid balance of the underlying obligation(s) are paid to the Seller as a 
credit against the unpaid balance of Seller's equity in this Contract; and (iii) Buyer shall have executed and delivered to Seller. Buyer's Trust 
Deed Note in the form, the amount, and with the terms of the Trust Deed Note described in Section C( I )(iii). Such note shall be subordinate only 
to the Deed(s) of Trust securing the new loan(s) and any remaining Deed(s) of Trust securing the underlying obligation(s) which have not been 
reconveyed. 
9. Taxes and Assessments. Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind which become due on the Property during the 
life of this contract. Seller covenants that there arc no taxes, assessments, or liens against the Property not mentioned in Section S except: 
General Property Taxes for the year 1987 and thereafter. 
which will be paid by: [ ] Seller [^ Buyer [ ] Other (explain) Credit for sellers portion of 1987 General Property 
Taxes was given to the buyer hereunder at the time of closing and buyer hereunder is 
responsible for full payment of 1987 General Property Taxes and all years thereafter. 
10. Covenant Against Liens. I:\ccpt for the liens and encumbrances listed in Sections Hand 9, Seller covenants to keep the Property 
free and clear of all liens and encumbrances resulting from acts of Seller. So long as Buyer is current hereunder. Seller agrees to keep current t In-
payments on all obligations to which Buyer's interest is subordinate. Should Seller default on the foregoing covenants on any one or more 
occasions. Buyer may, at Buyer's option, in whole or in part, make good Seller's default to Seller's obligee and deduct all expenditures so paid 
from future payments to Seller and Seller shall credit all Buyer's sums so expended to the indebtedness herein created just as il payment had been 
made directly to Seller under provisions of Section 4 above. 
11. Insurance. On and after the agreed date of possession. Buyer shall maintain at Buyer's expense, the following insurance policies 
naming the Seller as an additional insured and with a certificate of insurance provided to Seller that includes a ten (10) day notice of cancellation 
in favor of Seller: (i) insurance against loss by fire and other risks customarily covered by "All Kisk" insurance on insurable buildings and 
improvements at 80% of replacement value; and (ii) general liability insurance having coverage of not less than $—49Q,Q.QQ.QQ All 
such insurance policies shall be in companies which are duly licensed by the State of Utah and are acceptable to Seller. Acceptance of such 
companies by Seller may not be unreasonably withheld. 
12. Seller's Option To Discharge Obligations. In the event Buyer shall default in the payment of taxes, assessments, insurance 
premiums or other expenses of the Property, Seller may. at Seller's option, pay said taxes, assessments, insurance premiums or other expenses, 
and if Seller elects so to do. Buyer agrees to repay Seller upon demand all such sums so advanced and paid by Seller together with interest 
thereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of the greater of one (\%) or One percent (_1»Q v.\) \KI 
month until paid, and when the principal sum provided in this contract is paid, if Buyer fails to also repay Seller such advances. Seller may refuse 
to convey title to the Property until such repayment is made. 
13. Conveyance of Title. Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner specified herein, 
agrees to execute and deliver to Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the above described premises free 
and clear of all encumbrances except those which have accrued by or through the acts or neglect ol Buyer and those which Buyer has specifically 
agreed to pay or assume under the terms of this contract, and subject to the following numbered exceptions to title that are contained in the 
commitment for title insurance described in Section 7 hereof: 1 t h r o u g h and i n c l u d i n g 8^_12 # 1 3 , 14 
14. No Waste. Buyer agrees that Buyer will neither commit nor suffer to be committed any waste, spoil or destruction in or upon the 
Property which would impainScller's security, and that Buyer will maintain the Property in good condition. 
15. Attorney's Fees. Both parties agree thai, should cither party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the 
non-defaulting party or. should litigation be commenced, the prevailing party in litigation, shall be entitled to all costs and expenses, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this contract, or in obtaining possession of the Property, or 
in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law. 
16. Buyer's Default. Should buyer fail to comply with any of the terms hereof. Seller may. in addition to any other remedies afforded 
the Seller in this contract or by law, elect any of the following remedies: 
A. Seller shall give Buyer written notice specifically slating: (I) The Buyer's defauli(s); (2) that buyer shall have thirty (30) days 
from his receipt of such written notice within which to cure the dclault(s). which cure shall include payment of Seller's costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees; and (3) Seller's intent to elect this remedy if the Buyer does not cure thedefault(s) within the thirty (30) days. Should Buyer fail to 
cure such default(s) wilhin the thirty (30) days, then Seller shall give to Buyer another written notice informing Buyer of his failure to cure the 
default(s) and of Seller's election of this remedy. Immediately upon Buyer's receipt of this second written notice. Seller shall be released from all 
obligations at law and equity to convey the Property to Buyer, and Buyer shall become at once a tenant-at-will of Seller. All payments w hich 
have been made by Buyer prior thereto under this contract shall, subject to then existing law and equity, be retained by Seller as liquidated and 
agreed damages for breach of this contract; or 
B. Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments and all reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, and the 
use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent Seller, at Seller's option, from resorting to this or any other available remedy in the 
case of subsequent default; or 
C. Seller shall give Buyer written notice specifically staling: (I) The Buyer's default(s); (2) that Buyer shall have thirty (30) days 
from his receipt of such written notice within which to cure the default(s), which cure shall include payment of Seller's costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees; and (3) Seller's intent to elect this remedy if the Buyer does not cure the default(s) with the thirty (30) days. Should Buyer fail to 
cure such dcfault(s) within the thirty (30) days, then Seller shall give to Buyer another written notice informing Buyer of his failure to cure the 
default(s). Seller's election of this remedy, and that the entire unpaid balance hereunder is at once due and payable 1 hereupon, Seller may treat 
this contract as a note and mortgage, pass or tender title to Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately with a mortgage foreclosure in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. Upon filing the foreclosure complaint in court. Seller shall be entitled 10 the immediate 
appointment of a receiver The receiver may take possession of the premises, collect the rents, issue and profits therefrom and apply them 10 the 
payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold them pursuant to the order of the court U pon entry of a judgment of foreclosure Seller shall be 
entitled to possession of the premises during the period of redemption 
17. Time of Essence. It is expressly agreed that time is of the essence in this contract 
18 Warranties of Physical Condition. 
Rnyer has inspect erl the suhjf-
With respect to the physical condition of the Properly, Seller warrants the following 
"t premises rmrl acceptes the subject property "as is". 
Other Provisions. none. 
20 Captions. Section captions shall not in any way limit, modify, or alter the provisions in the Section 
21. Notices. Except as otherwise provided herein, all notices required under this contract will be effective when (a) personally 
delivered or, (b) mailed certified or registered, addressed to the applicable party at the address shown in Section 1, or at sueh other address as 
may be hereinafter designated by such party by written notice to ihc other party 
22. Binding Effect. This contract s binding on the heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the respective parties 
hereto. 
23. Entire Agreement. This contract contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto Any provisions hereof not enl orceable 
under the laws of the Slate of Utah shall not affect the validity of any other provisions hereof Nosupplement modification or amendment of this 
contract shall be binding on the parties hereto unless signed in writing by both parties hereto 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their signatures on the day and year first above written 
BUYER: 
Myung Ja (Sv 
/^W^ ^L 
SELLER 
Ke Ph (/CwL t / 
faTph 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
On the. 1st . day of May , 1 9 8 7 . . personally appeared before me 
K e e Hunq Un a n d S h i J a t f co , h u s b a n d a n d W i f e , Seller and signer ol the above instrument, who dul> aeknowledgcd to 
me that _Jr_hc_iL_ executed the same. 
My Commission'Expires: 
fi-fl-ftfl 
NOTARY PUBLIC — ' 
Residing at: West Bount i fu l , Utah 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF D&VIS 
On t he . -1st. . day of May ,19*3- . personally appeared before mc 
HafiSp Ch a n d Mynng J a n h , hngKanfl z\pA t*rj f o Buyer and signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to 
me that t H* y executed the same 
My Commission Expires: 
8-8-88 -
NOTARY PUBLIf/ 
Residing at- west Bountiful, Utah 
Tab 3 
"This is a legally binding form, if not understood, seek competent advice.'' 
A S S I G N M E N T O F C O N T R A C T 
THIS AGREEMENT, made In the City of Salt Lake, State of Utah on the 5 t h day 0 f 
. J a n u a r y 19 .9JL by and between . 8 A M N . . 9 . H . . a ^ 
hereinafter referred to as the assignors, and ^ M S I L T M A W 
hereinafter referred to as the assignees, h l S W l f e ' S S 5 o i n t tenants 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, unaer date of WLay.JL , 19 .8 .1 . . , KJaEL„KOJNCt...UWL..JaiXd.„SJHX..JJA...UWL 
, as sellers, entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with 
^ASZU...OH..arid...HXUW.G..JA...Q^...hls...wif.e 
as buyers, of Salt Lake City, Utah, which contract is delivered herewith, wherein and whereby the said sellers 
agreed to sell and the said buyers agreed to purchase, upon the terms, conditions, and provisions therein set 
forth, all that certain land, with the buildings and improvements thereon, erected, situate, lying and being in 
the County of . . . S a l t . . L a k e state of Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point 5 feet North of the Northwest Corner of 
Lot 28, Block 2, Dankowske Park, a Subdivision of Lot 10, Block 
I' F^lv® A c r e P l a t "A"' B i9 F i e l d Survey, and running thence 
South 211.4 feet; thence East 121.5 feet; thence North 211.4 
feet; thence West 121.5 feet; to the point of beginning. 
Subject to a right of way 50 feet wide for road and 
incidental purposes which lies within the bounds of Wilson 
Avenue. 
to which agreement in writing, reference is hereby made for all of the terms, conditions and provisions 
mereof, and 
WHEREAS, the assignees desire to acquire from the assignors all of the right, title and interest of the 
assignors in and to the said written agreement. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby mutually agreed as follows: 
1. That the assignors in consideration of the Payment of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, assign to the assignees, all their right, title and 
interest in and to the aforesaid Uniform Real Estate Contract of . . . . . M a y ^ l , 19...8 7., concerning the 
above described property. 
2. That to induce the assignees to pay the said sum of money and to accept the said contract, the as-
signors hereby represent to the assignee* as follows: 
a. That the assignors have duly performed all the conditions of the said contract. 
b. That the contract is now in full force and effect and that the unpaid balance of said contract is 
$.A1.7..i.9.Q.?i.«..7.3., with interest paid to the ! § . £ day of P.S.C.embe.r , 19...8.S. 
c. That said contract is assignable. 
3. That In consideration of the assignors executing and delivering this agreement, the assignees cove-
nant with the assignors as follows: 
a. That the assignees will duly Weep, observe and perform all of the terms, conditions and provisions 
of the said agreement that are to be kept, observed and performed by the assignors. 
b. That the assignees will save and hold harmless the assignors of and from any and all actions, suits, 
costs, damages, claims and demands whatsoever arising by reason of an act or omission of the 
assignees. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and y*ar 
first above written, 
*WA^WE*"TAKASHI*" SATSCTDA *** HASIW"6H 
*«$Utau...^J&{...—*&aJZtu:£cL. 
SEON SIL A..I«HW. SATSUDA MYUNG JA *..iaNo«« OH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of S a l t Lake } -
On the 5 t h r j a y of J a n u a r y 119 9 0 , personally appeared before me 
S a t s u d a . Wavne T a k a s h i & Seon S i l and Oh. H a s i n & * the signer of the w t^h j^jj^ rum^nt, w\duiy 
acknowledged to me that t he V executed the same. * Myung J a 
ft —19 — 9 1 My Commission Expire* q x ^ 7 X Residing at: 
*m 108 
